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Consumption of globally traded agricultural commodities like soy
and palm oil is one of the primary causes of deforestation and
biodiversity loss in some of the world’s most species-rich ecosys-
tems. However, the complexity of global supply chains has con-
founded efforts to reduce impacts. Companies and governments
with sustainability commitments struggle to understand their own
sourcing patterns, while the activities of more unscrupulous actors are
conveniently masked by the opacity of global trade. We combine
state-of-the-art material flow, economic trade, and biodiversity im-
pact models to produce an innovative approach for understanding
the impacts of trade on biodiversity loss and the roles of remote
markets and actors. We do this for the production of soy in the Brazil-
ian Cerrado, home to more than 5% of the world´s species. Distinct
sourcing patterns of consumer countries and trading companies result
in substantially different impacts on endemic species. Connections
between individual buyers and specific hot spots explain the dispro-
portionate impacts of some actors on endemic species and individual
threatened species, such as the particular impact of European Union
consumers on the recent habitat losses for the iconic giant anteater
(Myrmecophaga tridactyla). In making these linkages explicit, our ap-
proach enables commodity buyers and investors to target their ef-
forts much more closely to improve the sustainability of their supply
chains in their sourcing regions while also transforming our ability to
monitor the impact of such commitments over time.
supply chain | agricultural commodity | biodiversity impacts |
telecoupling | species
Species are being lost at 1 to 2 orders of magnitude abovebackground rates (1), with greatest losses resulting from
habitat conversion and degradation, particularly appropriation
for agriculture (2–4). Much of the impact of food crop pro-
duction in biodiverse tropical regions is associated with com-
modities destined for export (5), and as much as 80 to 99% of the
biodiversity impact of food crop consumption in industrialized
countries is incurred abroad (5). Work linking biodiversity
threats to global financial flows at the country level indicates that
at least 30% of threats to globally threatened species are linked
to international trade (6–8). Growing recognition of the role of
global consumption in driving remote environmental damage
elsewhere (9–11) has led to a number of private- and public-
sector commitments to reduce these impacts, particularly in ag-
ricultural commodity supply chains (12). However, our ability to
monitor in practically useful detail whether governments or
businesses are making progress toward these commitments has
been limited.
To devise and monitor solutions for sustainable production
and consumption we need to know the location of production
areas to a high degree of spatial accuracy and understand the
biodiversity impacts of production in these places. Crucially, we
must also understand how impacts are connected to globalized
supply chains and the key actors involved (13). Progress on
sustainability in supply chains will need clear and measurable
targets, pathways to achieve them, and accountability (12, 14).
Moreover, commitments of different stakeholders do not oper-
ate in isolation and when aligned can reinforce one another.
However, the lack of methods and data to integrate policy and
business perspectives prevents the design and implementation of
strategies to create opportunities or regulate for more sustain-
able business (12, 15).
Here we combine state-of-the-art material flow, economic,
and biodiversity models that link demand, trade, production, and
impact. We use a species-level estimate of loss, which allows us
to differentiate habitats that host the most vulnerable species
from those that do not but which would appear similar or
identical if broader classifications (e.g., “forest” or “natural
vegetation”) were used. Our results reveal the impacts of agri-
cultural commodity trade on biodiversity with unprecedented
spatial, sectoral, operational, and taxonomic resolution.
We use our framework to answer 4 questions that together
provide information for reducing biodiversity losses associated
with agricultural commodity demand. First, which countries
and sectors drive impacts? Understanding the role of specific
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consumption patterns and the responsibilities of consumers
around the globe helps inform national and international policy
making. Second, what are the relative roles of different com-
modity traders? Detailed supply chain information can help to
identify and develop partnerships for solutions. Third, what are
the impacts on high-profile species and important species as-
semblages? Highly resolved information on biodiversity impacts
can galvanize support from consumer groups and provide in-
formation for particular interventions around specific species
and risk hot spots. Fourth, how do government and private
commitments overlap? Understanding the commitments of di-
verse actors along the supply chain can help identify where
commitments coincide and hence where actions might be aligned
to reinforce one another.
We work through our framework using the example of Bra-
zilian soy production. Brazil is one of the world’s largest pro-
ducers and exporters of soy, a globally important commodity
embedded within many food products, particularly because of its
use as a source of protein in animal feed. In Brazil, soy pro-
duction is closely associated with the Cerrado (16, 17), which is
the largest savannah region in South America and hosts some
5% of global biodiversity, including over 4,800 plant and verte-
brate species found nowhere else (18). It is also one of the
world’s most important frontiers of agricultural expansion, with
many of its species facing dire threat (16–20). Our approach
produces insights into the connections between markets, soy
traders, and biodiversity losses at the point of production. We
consider these in the context of 2 high-profile collective com-
mitments: the New York Declaration on Forests, a voluntary
declaration by private-, public-, and third-sector parties with a
commitment to end forest loss by 2030 (21), and the Amsterdam
Declaration, a commitment by 7 European countries to elimi-
nate deforestation from agricultural commodity chains (22).
These commitments are a recognition that things need to
change; meeting them, however, requires a dramatic scaling up
of action.
Results
Which Countries and Sectors Are Driving Impacts? Information that
identifies the relative roles of different countries—and sectors
within them—can guide coherent action among consumer na-
tions to drive more sustainable production practices and pro-
vision of support to key industry actors (6). The top 10 countries
importing embedded soy from the Cerrado are Asian, European,
and North American (Table 1). However, while international
demand, especially from China, drives more than half of soy’s
impacts on endemic Cerrado biodiversity, the domestic market is
responsible for the greatest share of any country, with con-
sumption across all of Brazil driving 45% of soy-related impacts
(Table 1 and SI Appendix, Table S1). We consider these findings
against country-level commitments to 2 key declarations that aim
to support companies in eliminating deforestation from agri-
cultural commodity supply chains. The first is the New York
Declaration on Forests. This has been signed at the national or
local government level by most of the countries with the greatest
soy-linked biodiversity impacts in the Brazilian Cerrado, but the
2 countries with the greatest impact are notably absent (Table 1).
The second is the Amsterdam Declaration, for which 5 of the 7
European signatories are among the top 10 importers of soy-
driven biodiversity impacts in the Cerrado: Italy, France, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (Table 1).
Alongside the amount of soy consumed, the impact per unit
consumed also varies greatly between countries. Brazil and Italy,
for example, have over twice the impact per unit of soy con-
sumed than China, France or the United states. The 2 largest
consuming countries, Brazil and China, consume similar amounts
of soy from the Cerrado but show particularly high and low
impacts per ton, respectively (Fig. 1A). These differences arise
from differences in biodiversity losses in the municipalities from
which particular supply chains source soy. By combining high-
resolution trade data with impacts on biodiversity we find that
Brazilian consumer demand was met to a greater extent by
municipalities in the central and southern Cerrado, where
endemic richness is higher and impacts are thus greater (Fig.
1 B and C and SI Appendix, Fig. S1). Chinese demand, on the
other hand, was met from a more tightly concentrated area
in the northeast (Fig. 1C).
By linking direct material flows to global financial data, our
approach also captures both the reexports of soy (for example,
much of the soy consumed in Europe arrives via ports in the
Netherlands, from where it is reexported) and the consumption
of soy embedded in other products, such as in meat fed on soy-
derived feed. The Netherlands is a globally important trade hub,
receiving much of the soy coming directly from Brazil into the
European Union (EU) (Fig. 1D). However, tracking supply
chains only to the country of first import greatly overestimates
the country’s role as a driver of biodiversity loss, while for other
Amsterdam Declaration (AD) countries their role is substantially
underestimated unless we consider reexports and embedded
consumption of soy (Fig. 1D).
Table 1. The countries whose embedded consumption of soy from the Cerrado in 2011 is
estimated to have the greatest impact on endemic biodiversity (domestic plus top 10
international consuming countries)
Consuming region Relative impact Relative impact/mass consumed Commitment
Brazil 44.9% 0.87 *
China 22.0% 0.38
Japan 2.9% 0.52 NYDF
Germany 2.7% 0.49 NYDF/AD
Spain 2.5% 0.61 *
Thailand 2.3% 0.55
United States 1.9% 0.36 NYDF
United Kingdom 1.8% 0.46 NYDF/AD
France 1.8% 0.33 NYDF/AD
Netherlands 1.4% 0.60 NYDF/AD
Italy 1.2% 0.87 AD
Relative impact per unit mass of soy consumed from 0 (no impact) to 1 (greatest observed impact across all
consuming regions). We highlight country commitments to the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF) and
Amsterdam Declaration (AD). Asterisks indicate local, but not national, government signatories to NYDF. See
also SI Appendix, Table S1.
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Sectoral drivers of biodiversity loss vary markedly between
countries. In the case of AD countries, particularly Germany and
the United Kingdom, our results highlight the importance of “other
meat” (primarily pig and poultry) consumption (Fig. 1E). For Italy
and Norway, on the other hand, dairy and beef sectors contribute a
relatively larger proportion of their biodiversity footprint.
What Are the Relative Roles of Different Traders? For the Cerrado
we estimate that between 2000 and 2010, 33% of soy’s impacts
on endemic species were in Goiás State, which occupies just 16%
of the biome (SI Appendix, Fig. S2 and Table S2). Of 41 traders
exporting soy from Goiás in 2011, the top 10 account for 91% of
exports. Disaggregating the data to the municipality level reveals
the highly clustered nature of company operations (SI Appendix,
Fig. S2). The largest exporter in each municipality accounts for a
mean of 97% of exports. Just 5 traders account for all soy exports
from the 3 most heavily affected municipalities, which together
incur 56% of the state’s soy-driven biodiversity losses but cover <4%
of the area.
What Are the Impacts on High-Profile Species and Important Species
Assemblages? Quantifying how consumption drives losses of
charismatic, culturally important, or valuable species and habitats
can raise the profile of environmental issues and bring into focus
the tangible impacts and risks of sourcing from a particular area
(23). The spatial and taxonomic resolution of the component
models in our framework enables fine-scale, species-specific in-
formation that is typically masked in national-level analyses. To
illustrate this, we compare impacts of soy-driven habitat loss on 2
iconic species, the maned wolf (Chrysocyon brachyurus) and giant
anteater (Myrmecophaga tridactyla), with impacts on endemic
species, and characterize these as flows from the state in which the
losses occur through to the country of final consumption of the
impact-linked soy (Fig. 2). This reveals some striking patterns
Fig. 1. (A) Impact of Cerrado-sourced soy on endemic biodiversity (as a percentage of global impacts of soy in the Cerrado), plotted against embedded
consumption of Cerrado-sourced soy (as a percentage of global Cerrado-sourced soy consumption) for the 7 AD countries, Brazil, the countries of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU28), China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), India, North America, South America, and the rest of the world (RoW). Gray line indicates
mean global impact per unit of soy consumption. (B) Spatial pattern of our endemic biodiversity loss index within the Cerrado during the period 2000 to 2010.
(C) Difference (tons) between production for domestic consumption (all Brazil) and Chinese consumption. Negative values (blue) are municipalities where
production for Chinese consumption exceeds production for Brazil. Positive values (orange/red) are municipalities where production for Brazilian con-
sumption exceeds production for China. (D) Comparison of the relative soy-attributed biodiversity impact that is directly imported to AD countries and impact
that is attributed to final consumption within those countries (i.e., the latter accounts for both reexports and embedded consumption). (E) Sectoral and
countrywise differences for AD countries showing the relative impact of 3 key soy-linked sectors as a percentage of each country’s consumption of soy across
all sectors combined. The value above the bar indicates the relative importance of each country to global biodiversity impacts of Cerrado-sourced soy.
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resulting from differences between the threats facing different
species and from differences in sourcing between consuming
countries. For example, the majority of the EU’s impact on the
maned wolf is in Mato Grosso, while for Brazil it is in other states.
This has implications for the targeting of conservation interven-
tions by downstream actors wanting to mitigate specific impacts
associated with their activities. We also found that the giant ant-
eater’s range has been more heavily impacted by past habitat loss
than that of the maned wolf [which better tolerates pasture and
arable land (17)] and that the EU has played a large role in recent
losses, with impacts mostly arising in Mato Grosso. Unlike for the
maned wolf and giant anteater, losses in Goiás and Distrito
Federal dominate impacts across endemic species, largely due to
the high number of endemics, particularly plants, found in these
states (Fig. 2 and SI Appendix, Fig. S1).
How Do Government and Private Commitments Overlap? In 2011,
companies with zero-deforestation commitments were responsible
for ∼80% of soy imports for France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom (Fig. 3 and SI Appendix, Table S3). The Netherlands, on
the other hand, has a more diverse supplier base, with ∼50%
supplied by traders with zero-deforestation commitments.
Fig. 2. Chord diagrams showing impacts on likelihood of persistence due to soy expansion between 2000 and 2010 for 2 charismatic species (Top) and for
all endemics (Bottom Left). Losses are calculated for each municipality according to the total embedded flows of soy and then aggregated to state level
for visualization. Chords show the flow from states on the left-hand side (BA = Bahia, dark blue; DF = Distrito Federal, gray; GO = Goiás, red; MA =
Maranhão, cyan; MG =Minas Gerais, light green; MS =Mato Grosso do Sul, purple; MT =Mato Grosso, dark green; PI = Piauí, pink; PR = Paraná, dark olive
green; RO = Rondônia, brown; SP = São Paulo, dark gray; TO = Tocantins, gold) through to the country or region of final consumption on the right-hand
side (Brazil, South America, North America, European Union, India, China, and the rest of world). The proportion of remaining suitable habitat within the
Cerrado for the 2 species (Bottom Right) and the mean for all endemic species. Light gray: suitable habitat lost from the preindustrial era to the year 2000;
red: losses during the 2000 to 2010 study period (as represented in the chord diagrams); medium gray: losses between 2010 and 2014; dark gray:
remaining suitable habitat in 2014.
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Discussion
It is encouraging that many of the countries and traders most
exposed to the risks of deforestation and biodiversity loss in their
supply chains have joined high-profile declarations to eliminate
deforestation from their supply chains (e.g., refs. 21, 22, and 24).
However, company commitments to reducing deforestation in
supply chains vary widely in their detail, ambition, and meaning
(12, 15). Understanding alignment between government and
trader commitments will help identify where action should be
focused, reveal potential leverage points, and help foster co-
ordinated solutions for international supply chains that span
multiple stakeholders across the private–public interface (12,
15). If supporting companies make good on their commitments,
this would in turn help governments make significant progress
toward their own commitments to eliminate deforestation and
may push the sustainability bar higher for smaller or newer actors
in the European market. Within our analyses, the 2 countries
with the greatest overall impacts, Brazil and China, have not yet
signed key declarations at the national level (although note that
Mato Grosso, an important soy-producing state within the Cer-
rado, has committed to its Produce, Conserve, and Include
Strategy, which aims to reduce Cerrado deforestation by 95%
and to restore habitat; ref. 25).
Attributing impacts to the country of first import can both
severely underestimate (e.g., Denmark and Norway) and over-
estimate (e.g., the Netherlands) impacts attributed to a country’s
final consumption. However, in the same way that identifying key
traders operating within the supply chain can help identify im-
portant opportunities for intervention, so too can identifying the
most significant hubs for trade. The Netherlands is the largest
importer of soy in Europe and the second-largest exporter of
agricultural products in the world (26). It also processes ∼25% of
its soy imports to produce animal feed (26). These factors un-
derlie its central role in the global soy value chain and its
founding role in the Amsterdam Declaration. The Netherlands
could continue to exert disproportionate influence on trading
companies and buyers as a convening power and focal point of
private–public dialogue and partnerships (e.g., Dutch Soy
Coalition, Dutch SoyWorking Group, and the Dutch Soy Platform
Initiative) (24, 26). The Dutch government has also provided
support to processors and buyers that invest in certification (Soy
Fast Track Fund), as well as to farmers to enable them to pro-
duce more sustainable soy (Farmer Support Program) (26). In
addition, governments have an important convening and fi-
nancing role to play in establishing sustainable finance, including
provision of credit lines to farmers who adhere to higher sus-
tainability criteria or support to scale up innovative solutions to
sustainability challenges (e.g., refs. 27 and 28). Our estimates of
the impacts of final consumption highlight the substantial re-
sponsibilities too of other EU countries, such as Spain, which is
not currently a signatory to the declaration but could be a focal
point for targeted political influence by existing signatories
(Table 1).
While the Netherlands may hold some influence because of its
large trade volumes, its diverse portfolio of traders could make
policy processes more complex and contested. In contrast to
other AD countries a large proportion of soy exported to (and
through) the Netherlands is from traders without zero-deforestation
commitments. Hence, even if those with existing commitments
delivered on them, this would capture just half of the Cerrado
soy traded through the Netherlands (Fig. 3 and SI Appendix,
Table S3). Working with countries that directly import substan-
tially smaller volumes, such as the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany, may help the Netherlands government to encourage
currently uncommitted yet major traders such as Caramuru and
Granol to sign up to targets to eliminate deforestation from their
supply chains.
There are several sources of uncertainty within the models
presented, for example, in modeling land cover, estimating bio-
diversity loss, modeling trade, and year-to-year variability of
supply chains. The Trase Spatially Explicit Information on Pro-
duction to Consumption Systems (SEI-PCS) model of sub-
national production and export is built from key government
statistics and data that are compiled to calculate agricultural
productivity and to collect tax revenues (29). This allows con-
siderable confidence in this aspect of the modeling. The Input-
Output Trade Analysis (IOTA) model employed in the analysis
is one of several multiregional input–output models (MRIOs)
that are available globally, all of which will provide somewhat
different quantitative results due to differences in their con-
struction (30). Our results are illustrative of the impacts that
different countries might have, highlighting the heterogeneity
that is expected across the trade system. Use of such information
in risk assessment or supply chain decision making should con-
sider the assumptions made and associated limitations of the
modeling approaches. More targeted analysis (e.g., of particular
supply chains looking at specific priority species) would benefit
from further sensitivity analyses to explore how changes in as-
sumptions might affect conclusions. We use 2011 trade data in
our analyses that provide a snapshot of a dynamic system, par-
ticularly in the most active frontiers of agricultural expansion.
Any intervention should be based on multitemporal analyses of
spatial patterns and trends, as well as iterative engagement with
stakeholders to ensure their accuracy and relevance. However,
because of the investments in infrastructure (such as silos and
crushing facilities) and knowledge and interdependencies be-
tween actors, we expect traders to stay relatively connected to
particular production locations over a 3 to 5 y span, with more
significant changes occurring over longer periods (refs. 20, 31,
and 32; see supplementary analyses in SI Appendix, Figs. S3 and
S4). Understanding how the data available within our framework
might be used to help determine accountability for impacts
Fig. 3. Alignment of government commitments with sustainability goals of
key traders. Chord diagram representing direct soy trade from the Brazilian
Cerrado to the 7 countries of the Amsterdam Declaration from the largest
traders in 2011 (companies shown were among the top 3 traders in 2011 for
at least one of the countries; companies trading smaller volumes are ag-
gregated and shaded gray). Green shaded chords indicate exports via com-
panies with zero-deforestation commitments; orange and brown shades
indicate no such commitment (data from company websites as of December
2018).
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occurring across a dynamic trading landscape, where impacts can
occur several years prior to trading activities, deserves additional
research focus.
Conclusion
Currently, many sustainability commitments are little more than
statements of intent and a recognition that things need to change
(12, 15). Meeting these commitments requires collective ac-
tion to be scaled up through multistakeholder partnerships,
landscape-scale approaches, and public–private initiatives
(12). Identifying links between the intensification and expansion of
agricultural commodity production and the demand that drives it is
a vital first step to engage the political and private actors with the
greatest responsibility and influence. We provide a highly flexible
framework for delivering a range of practical insights to stake-
holders in international commodity supply chains. Businesses can
use this information to understand risks in their supply chains, while
civil society, consumers, and shareholders can use it to hold gov-
ernments and businesses to account on their commitments. Investors
too are increasingly interested in understanding investment-linked
environmental and social risks (33), and this will likely increase as
transparency initiatives more precisely link the environmental dam-
age caused by commodity production to hitherto opaque financial
systems underpinning it (34).
The high spatial resolution of our trade model tracking pro-
duction and subnational flows is a major advance for 2 reasons:
First, in enhancing the credibility and spatial representation of
estimates of environmental impact and, second, in transforming
our ability to devise and implement responses. For example,
campaigners can use impacts on flagship species to galvanize
support from consumer groups and to promote responsible
consumption across supply chain actors. Higher-resolution
models allow us to develop land use management strategies to
target particular areas for improving yields, setting aside areas
for protection in expansion landscapes, or expanding production
into degraded land according to the level of endemicity or of
historical impacts on biodiversity. More generally, the spatial
resolution demonstrated here allows the development of more
credible estimates for a suite of indicators of environmental and
social impacts. This species-level metric complements, rather
than replaces, other measures of biodiversity loss based on the
loss of ecosystems (such as the loss of the Cerrado or de-
forestation) (e.g., refs. 35 and 36). Taken together, these provide
a more complete picture of how the trade in a commodity such as
soy drives both immediate and longer-term losses and has im-
pacts at scales from the very local to global. It also allows as-
sessment of complementarity or trade-offs between, for example,
protecting forests versus endemic species.
Our approach is applicable to a wide range of globally traded
agricultural commodities. However, to “catalyze a race to the top”
(14), actors must also be supported by mechanisms that allow and
recognize iterative improvements. Without such mechanisms,
shedding light on sustainability problems within particular
supply chains may cause actors to shift to different production
regions, rather than improving practices in vulnerable areas, or
to start supplying consuming regions without commitments to
eliminate deforestation or where consumer pressure is currently
lower (12, 15). Anticipating such “leakage” between areas, coun-
tries, and, indeed, different commodity crops is vital. In this context
our ability to document country–trader relationships is likely to play
an important role. Many of the biggest traders source from multiple
producer countries, sell their goods globally, and have activities that
span several commodities (37). This global reach may allow suc-
cessful sustainability initiatives to quickly scale up to other regions
and commodities. By enabling monitoring of shifts of traders be-
tween markets our framework can also help minimize leakage by
ensuring that sustainability commitments apply across companies’
operations. Moreover, because of the dominant role that a relatively
few traders hold as a nexus of global commodity flows (38, 39),
pressure from major economies, such as the AD countries, to im-
prove environmental standards could drive improvements to the
sustainability of supply chains to other consuming regions.
Methods
We compiled and integrated existing data sources, linking complementary
approaches to derive information on consumption patterns driving species
declines and shedding light on the supply chains involved (SI Appendix, Fig.
S5). Existing MRIOs use data on intersectoral financial transactions to rep-
resent full global trade and consumption but sacrifice commodity-specific
detail and spatial resolution. Conversely, material flow analyses—descrip-
tions of the physical movement of commodities—can be used to track pro-
duction and trade of individual commodities but generally capture only a
portion of the supply chain (40). We therefore developed a hybridized MRIO
for soy trade that combines traditional input–output analyses with highly
detailed subnational material flow data from the SEI-PCS model un-
derpinning the Trase platform (36, 41) (SI Appendix). We used these to tease
out the activities of producers, traders, and consumers. We linked the
models to estimates of species-by-species losses of suitable habitat to derive
a measure of biodiversity impact that accounts for species-specific differ-
ences in range sizes, sensitivities to land use change, and historical habitat
loss (17) (SI Appendix, Fig. S5). We focused on the impacts of soy production
in 2000 to 2010 using habitat loss data for 2000 to 2010 and soy trade data
for 2011. We chose this allocation period (i.e., attributing 2000 to 2010 losses
to 2011) because it can take several years from initial clearing of land to
eventual harvesting and selling soy.
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